This paper evaluates the French RAR program (Réseaux Ambition Réussite or Ambition Success Networks), a junior high school program started in 2006 which intended to concentrate means and funds on well-chosen disadvantaged junior high schools. We use the criteria of eligibility to estimate a regression discontinuity model.
RAR program: design and background

A brief history
In 1982 a new program -Educational Priority Zones (ZEP) -was conducted in France. This policy's main objective was to increase efforts in unsuccessful zones to reduce inequalities.
These new education priority zones aimed to set up an educational project that would provide support to underachieving students. In 1985, its main focus was redirected to address deficiencies in 'core learning' such as reading and French. Afterwards successive reforms were introduced, each one expanding the number of schools concerned, but without increasing further inputs in already treated schools. Benabou et al. (2004) draw three main conclusions concerning these Education Priority Zones. First they argue that the subsidies were divided between too many schools and mainly given to teachers via supplementary wages without any overtime teaching. Hence 4 the actual per capital allocation of funds to pupils was scarce. Secondly, the authors find that the treated junior high schools experienced a decrease in their total number of students and an increase in the proportion of socially disadvantaged pupils. Teachers also migrated from these schools. Their turnover increased after the assignment of these schools to priority zones. Finally, Benabou et al. (2004) found no significant effect on different measures of student achievement, or on high-school graduation. These disappointing results suggest a restructuring of the ZEP program that better targets efforts and funds.
The Ambition Success Network policy
As a consequence, the reform introduced in 2006 pursued the goal of better targeting funds and efforts. The education priority map was reshaped, and the resources were given to a smaller number of schools (249 junior high schools in 2006-2007 against around 900 with the previous policy). New zones were defined and named "Réseaux Ambition Réussite" (Ambition Success Networks). These networks are made up of one junior high-school (6th to 9th grade) and some primary and/or nursery schools (1st to 5th grade, or before 1st grade). These entities share a common project under the guidance of a committee composed of the heads of the junior high-schools and some representatives of the primary or nursery schools. At the beginning of the 2006-2007 school year, 249 networks were created, consisting of 249 junior high-schools and 1,715 elementary schools. It represented 126,000 pupils in junior high schools: one junior high school student in twenty was enrolled in a RAR targeted school.
The Ministry of Education recommended to its regional heads ("recteurs") that each network get three to four supplementary teachers, some teaching assistants and at least one full-time nurse. On a national level, this amounted to 1,000 supplementary teachers, and 3,000 teaching assistants. However considerable discretion was left to regional heads. Although the list of "RAR" junior high-schools was decided in a concerted way, the list of primary and nursery schools, and the resources devoted to each network were chosen by the regional heads. Moreover the type of educational services provided was left to the discretion of the junior high schools and regional heads, with no requirement for accountability.
The number of RAR networks has evolved since their introduction. From 249 in [2006] [2007] , there were 254 public junior high-schools at the beginning of the 2008-2009 school year and 118,000 junior students. There are large regional discrepancies: the proportion of "RAR" junior high-schools ranges from 0.4% for the regional area of Grenoble to 13% for the regional area of Aix-Marseille. There are also a few private "RAR" junior high schools 3 students in 6th grade had to be equal to or above 67%. Second, either of the two following criteria had to be met: the proportion of students who have repeated two grades or more when they entered 6th grade had to be at or above 10%; or the school average score at the entrance evaluation of 6th grade had to be at or below 47%.
Additional criteria that were used to define the final list of RAR junior high schools included the local unemployment rate and the proportion of people benefiting from social assistance. Instead of the 164 initially chosen with the three criteria previously mentioned, 249 were finally selected after an agreement between the French Ministry of Education and its regional heads.
Expected results
If we assume that 1,000 supplementary teachers were uniformly assigned across new RAR junior high schools, then we would expect an 8% increase in the total number of teachers in RAR schools versus non-RAR schools. As mentioned before however, regional head masters have considerable discretion. For instance, even if the Ministry of Education gives them additional teachers that must be specifically assigned within the RAR juniorhigh-schools, the regional head officials can assign them as they see fit. In particular, teachers already working in a RAR school may be transferred to a non-RAR school to ensure the stability of the total number of teachers both in RAR and non-RAR schools.
This eviction phenomenon is credible if regional head officials are reluctant to treat similar schools differently: e.g. two schools just below and above the selection thresholds were alike before program assignment.
Some parents may have interpreted the RAR assignment as a negative signal, as a consequence the number of pupils in treated schools may have decreased. Benabou et al. (2004) and Benabou et al. (2009) have discussed such a decrease for ZEP-schools during the 90's.
In that case, the teacher-pupil ratio may increase more than expected.
If the teacher-pupil ratio increases enough, the average class size may decrease. The effect of class-size on pupil achievement, using the seminal method of Angrist & Lavy (1999) , is often reported as negative (see Angrist & Lavy (1999) , Leuwen et al. (2008) , and for the French case, Gary-Bobo & Mahjoub (2006) and Piketty & Valdenaire (2006) argued that the assignment of schools to the RAR-program acts as a negative signal for the teachers as well, who would then prefer to be migrate to non-treated schools. However, teacher mobility and tenure are closely related: the less experience they have, the lower their bargaining power to move. Moreover in the previous ZEP program, teachers willing to work within ZEP schools were promoted quicker to encourage them to teach in such schools. However bigger promotions ease the transfer to another school if requested. And it was noticed indeed that the turnover of the teaching teams was higher in ZEP schools, which can be harmful to school management. Ly (2010) observed that in 1999, the ZEP assignment change induced the mobility of oldest teachers from ZEP to non-ZEP schools.
Finally the policy can modify the sorting of pupils across schools. Benabou et al. (2004) and Benabou et al. (2009) found that school discrepancy between treated and untreated schools increases after assignment: they measure school discrepancy through the proportion of pupils not enrolled in the school cafeteria. Other studies show that parents take into account school choice in their decision to move or relocate (Fack & Grenet (2010) for the case of Paris). More generally, sociologists have reported the existence of parental strategies concerning the schooling of their children (François & Poupeau (2004) ) and economists have tried to quantify the valuation of schools (Black (1999) , Fack & Grenet (2010) , Gibbons & Machin (2003) ). All these parental strategies are based on available 7 information about schools and assignment to the RAR program can affect parental choice.
Even if one can not a priori exclude the possibility that parents give a higher valuation to RAR-schools because such schools get higher resources, empirical results in the literature suggest that school-based discrimination increases segregation. Should there be such an increase in segregation the effect on average test scores in the final exam is muddled: the policy may increase the efficiency of treated schools, but such an increase in efficiency may be compensated for by a sorting effect. Our data only allow us to compare average results across schools. This is a clear limit of this paper and the reader must bear in mind that the estimates on the final score exam mix the two effects.
Data and some descriptive statistics
To analyze the effectiveness of the RAR program, we use school-level data collated from various administrative sources of the Ministry of Education:
• The first dataset is an exhaustive pupil-level cross-sectional dataset (Scolarité) for every student in junior or secondary high school. This data provides cross-sectional information about age, nationality, residence location, main parent's occupation, class, languages and other options, school lunch status, and the same variables for the previous year.
• The second dataset is an exhaustive teacher-level panel dataset (Relais) for every teacher in junior or secondary high school. This provides information on the total number of hours taught by each teacher, for each subject they teach, in each school, along with their age and degree.
• We supplement the pupil-level data with a third, exhaustive, pupil-level dataset that contains their national exam scores, (Brevet des Colleges), taken at the end of the 9th grade. We are unable to fully merge the two pupil-level datasets due to the absence of a unique student identification number that could combine them both. We are however able to provide a distribution of test scores for every school and for every year by combining these two datasets.
• Moreover the proportion of SEGPA pupils has the same distribution below and above both considered thresholds. Hence excluding SEGPA students from teaching, score, and resource indicators does not lead to biased estimates. 5 The way they take the national exam is different from the non-disabled. 6 In the data, only the occupation of one of the two parents is available. This parent, who is usually the father, is called the family head.
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RAR schools. Unlike 'executive-children', 'unemployed-children' and 'blue-collar-children'
are over-represented in RAR schools. In grade 6 in 2006/2007, over 27% of children in RAR schools have an unemployed parent compared to non-RAR schools where this figure is approximatively 9%. Table 1 also presents proxies of average expenditure per pupil, namely average class size and average weekly hours of teaching per pupil. One year before treatment, average class size was around 21 in RAR schools and 24 in non-RAR schools. Similarly, average per-pupil weekly teaching hours was about 12% higher in RAR schools (1.41 versus 1.24 in non-RAR schools). In non reported results we find that this figure holds for all grades: many RAR schools previously benefited from the ZEP program, hence from a higher teacher-pupil ratio.
Teachers are less qualified and are younger in RAR junior high schools. The proportion of physical education teachers was larger in RAR schools. The descriptive statistics show that a naive comparison between the treated and nontreated schools is unsatisfactory to test efficiency of the RAR program. Conditioning on some important observable covariates may mitigate bias but even in this case, the interpretation is likely to be misleading: assignment to treatment may have been driven by some unobserved variables. To overcome this issue, one difference-in-difference strategy may be adopted using the panel dimension, but this would be valid only if temporal trends are the same between treated and non-treated schools. Simple panel-data regressions reported in Table 2 show that temporal trends between 2003 and 2005 differ significantly (at the 5% level) for many variables.
7 At baseline, we find that the gap in the proportion of 13-year-olds enrolling into grade 6 falls. This however is not true for children whose parents are executives or blue-collar workers. The gap in average class size between RAR and non-RAR schools also increases, and structures of teacher qualifications and age also evolve differently in the treated and non-treated schools before the beginning of the policy.
These different evolutions rule out the use of a difference-in-difference estimation strategy.
3 Identification and estimation strategy 3.1 A fuzzy regression discontinuity design
As explained in the previous section, the assignment to RAR treatment is based on thresholds of some predetermined variables. These key features of the RAR-policy allow us to use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effects of the RAR program on different outcomes such as means, but also signaling and sorting. Such a discontinuity is clearly supported by This discontinuity in the probability of being treated implies that local average treatment effects (LATE ) are nonparametrically identified (Hahn et al. (2001) ). The basic idea is having around 67% of socially disadvantaged pupils and having more than 10% of pupils having repeated a grade twice before Grade 6. We can also identify the LATE for junior high schools having around 10% of repeating pupils and with more than 67% of socially disadvantaged pupils.
To describe the identification approach used in this paper, let T i be an indicator equal i cannot be manipulated, the rules of assignation to the treatment generate an "as-good-as random assignment". We denote by the dummy C L (respectively C F ) the dummies of being a complying school for the threshold Z L = 10%
(respectively for the threshold Z F = 67%). Assuming continuity of conditional regression functions of potential outcomes on running variables, and monotonicity of treatment in a neighborhood of discontinuities (see Imbens & Lemieux (2008) ), we can identify the following local average treatment effects:
We impose the restriction 80% ≥ Z F on the second parameter because discontinuity vanishes when Z L = 10% and Z F close to 100% (see Figure 1 ).
Can the threshold be manipulated ?
To get consistent estimates, the conditional regression functions of potential outcomes on the running variable (see Imbens & Lemieux (2008) Unlike the difference-in-difference approach, the regression-discontinuity method does not rely on such an assumption of common trend. Nonetheless the regression discontinuity estimates cannot be extrapolated to the whole population of treated schools, and they may be not precise enough. This is a concern when the effects we want to measure have a low magnitude, or when few observations are located near the threshold. To compensate for the lack of precision, we can use observations further away from the threshold, but at the cost of an increased bias. 9 Our strength is the panel data at hand. We thus add school fixed effects and time dummies, and they turn out to explain more than 75% of the variance of the outcomes we studied. As a result, we are able to statistically measure small effects. However, we need to check whether complying schools around the thresholds display common trends in the absence of treatment to ensure our approach is valid. We tested this assumption using observations before the RAR program was set up, from 2004 to 2006: no trend difference protrudes around both thresholds before September 2006.
10
We estimate the LATE by a two stage panel least squares (TSLS) regression after selecting our data around both thresholds. This is equivalent to using a uniform kernel for the local linear regression, as suggested by Hahn et al. (2001) . For observations such that Z L ∈ [10 − h, 10 + h] and 80% ≥ Z F ≥ 67% and with c = 10%, and for observations such that Z F ∈ [67 − h, 67 + h] and Z L ≥ 10% and with c = 67%, we compute the following TSLS estimates:
where It is important to notice that we have not induced any estimation bias by selecting our sub samples having checked that the repeating rate distribution was continuous around 67% disadvantaged threshold, (resp. the disadvantaged student proportion around 10% repeating threshold). The estimates we obtained are only local average treatment effects and we cannot answer for the efficiency of the global policy since we would have to impose unrealistic parametric assumption to identify the ATE on the whole public school set.
9 Adding covariates in the regressions decreases the variance of the estimates by the proportion of the explained variance of the outcomes by covariates.
10 Common trend tests around both thresholds are available upon request.
The outcomes
We provide an assessment of RAR treatment along different dimensions:
1. First, we consider outcomes that proxy for expenditures, to estimate the intensity of positive discrimination: average class size and weekly per-pupil teaching hours at the school level and for different grades (from Grade 6 to Grade 9).
2. A second set of outcomes considered are observable characteristics of pupils at the beginning of Grade 6. Hence, we examine pupil sorting across treated and nontreated schools. These are: family head occupation 11 , dummy for attending cafeteria at lunch and the total number of pupils.
3. A third set of outcomes examines changes to the teaching structure. We focus on teacher-related outcomes such as the percentage of teaching hours per qualification, and the teacher age structure. We distinguish between four types of qualification:
physical education (PE) teachers, post-graduate teachers ("agrégation", the top competitive examination), junior high school teachers ("certified" teachers recruited by a more open competitive examination) and finally, other teachers that have not been recruited by the usual competitive examinations (a priori less qualified). We also distinguish teachers by age, as it proxies tenure: less than 30, between 30 and 39, between 40 and 54, 55 and over.
4. The last set of outcomes is related to the academic achievement of pupils: we study the means and quantiles (Q10-Q25-Q50-Q75-Q90) of French and maths score distributions, at the final exam in Grade 9.
Studying these outcomes will provide us with an answer about any potential negative signaling effects of RAR treatment.
For all these outcomes, we test sensitivity to bandwidth choice h. We select the observations around both thresholds. For the percentage of disadvantaged pupils entering 6th grade, results are reported for h = 4, 6 and 8. week divided by the number of pupils (denoted resp. P/C and H/P , where P stands for pupil, H for teaching hour, and C for class).
We actually see that the 1,000 supplementary teachers had not been uniformly distributed across RAR junior high schools: the recommendation that each RAR junior high school receive 4 supplementary teachers was not strictly followed by each regional head. It can be inferred that teacher assignment was conducted on an ad-hoc basis, driven partly by regional heads and teachers' preferences. Furthermore regional heads and headmasters of junior high schools have discretion on how to allocate additional teachers to different grades, which is why it is important to study the effect of RAR assignment on school resources, since we do not clearly know whether the policy has been followed by regional heads and school headmasters.
Average class size and per-pupil teaching hour estimations do not match political commitments. Specifically, results differ only very slightly across the two discontinuities, implying that treatment has only a weak effect on resources if any. For schools where
and Z L ≥ 10% in 2004, we notice a small effect of the policy on class size reduction but the magnitude of this effect drastically decreases when estimation is made using a larger bandwidth (see Table 3a ). The robustness of this measured effect is therefore questionable.
A more robust and significant result concerns per-pupil teaching hours for Grades 6 and 7. The magnitude of this effect is more stable across bandwidth changes (see Table 3a ).
For schools with Z L = 10% and 67% ≤ Z F ≤ 80% in 2004, we find no significant effect on per-pupil teaching hours or on class size (see Table 3b ). Per-pupil teaching hours decrease less than expected for all grades. far from both thresholds.
To sum up, we can conclude that the treatment has only a weak effect on per-pupil teaching hours and class size in borderline schools.
What therefore has happened for schools away from the thresholds? Though we do not have a reliable identification strategy to evaluate the RAR effects on these schools, we can nonetheless provide some descriptive statistics. Though the program may have had no effect on the resources of borderline schools, it may anyway have induced some teachers to relocate, or some parents to withdraw their children from the treated schools, and this would impact on school achievement.
Pupils entering Grade 6
We now present results on student enrollment. Before September 2007, pupils were assigned to junior high schools on the basis of their residence. Parents could avoid this assignment by either choosing a private junior high school, or a specific language or option not available in the assigned school when their child entered Grade 6. 13 Previous studies suggest that 13 In France, in Grade 6, pupils have to choose options that they did not follow before, usually a language.
If a pupil wants to avoid his or her assigned junior high school, he or she can ask for learning Russian or Chinese. Estimated treatment effect, standard error in bracket, unilateral test of equality between treated and non-treated schools. Level: * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1% 22 parents are sensitive to junior high school districts when choosing their residence (Fack & Grenet (2010) , Black (1999) , Gibbons & Machin (2003) , Maurin (2004) ). Since September 2007, in the aftermath of the Presidential election, the number of exemptions to assignment has increased and it has been easier for parents to choose their children's junior high school.
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In this context, that of parental junior high school choice, the "RAR" label could have had mixed consequences. On the one hand, it could act as a positive signal for parentsadditional school inputs or resources per child-or as a negative signal -indicating severe difficulties at the treated school. For instance, Benabou et al. (2004 Benabou et al. ( , 2009 found that the proportion of students who have lunch at school decreases when junior high schools receive the "ZEP" label (Education Priority Zones). This evolution may indicate an increase in segregation of ZEP and non-ZEP junior high schools: poorer kids do not go to the cafeteria for school lunch. The authors also found mixed effects on the total number of pupils in ZEP junior high schools: for junior high schools treated in 1989, the total number of junior pupils decreased relative to non-ZEP schools. However for those treated in 1990, they did not find any effect. For our part, we did not find any significant difference between RAR and non-RAR schools near the second discontinuity concerning the total number of pupils entering Grade 6 (see Table 4b ), while for the first discontinuity, we found an increase in pupils entering Grade 6 (see Table 4a ). Furthermore, we found no significant effect of treatment on the proportion of pupils entering Grade 6 who have lunch at school (see Tables 4a and 4b ).
We also use parental occupations at the beginning of Grade 6 to test whether social segregation increases in "RAR" junior high schools. Results differ along both discontinuities.
For schools around the 'disadvantaged' discontinuity, we found a small negative effect in the enrollment of children whose parents are self-employed, and to some extent, on enrollment of children whose parents are involved in intermediate occupations. This reduction goes along with an increase in the proportion of blue collar parents (see Table 4a ). For schools near the 'repeating' discontinuity, we do not observe such an effect (see Table 4b ).
We therefore conclude that treatment effects are heterogeneous, since we get different results on both discontinuities. For the first one, RAR policy has had an adverse effect, while for the second no significant effect is detected.
Teaching structure
In this subsection, we report results on another set of outcomes related to teaching structure. The outcomes we consider are teacher mobility, their seniority and their qualifica-23 tions. For instance, some incentives, such as faster access to promotion, were implemented to encourage teachers to teach longer within RAR schools.
For the ZEP program, these issues were studied by Benabou et al. (2004 Benabou et al. ( , 2009 ) with a different identification strategy. The authors found that the incentives were insufficient to cap the high turnover of teachers in treated schools. Ly (2010) found that the reform of the ZEP program in 1999 had had an adverse effect on the age and the experience of teachers in treated schools. To study this issue, we compare the structure of age and qualifications of teachers in schools close to the discontinuities. Tables 5a and 5b report regression discontinuity estimates. These results are novel with respect to the Preferential Educational Policy litterature and differ from the results obtained by Benabou et al. (2004 Benabou et al. ( , 2009 ) and Ly (2010) .
For schools where Z F = 67%, the proportion of teachers over 55 has increased significantly with the introduction of the RAR program. For these schools, the proportion of highly qualified teachers ("agrégation") has decreased while the proportion of teachers having a non-standard qualification in junior high schools has increased. This may be due to the fact that RAR policy has encouraged primary school teachers to work in junior high schools. The new teachers assigned to treated junior high schools may more often have been primary school teachers, and often the oldest, being the most experienced, are more likely to have been selected. It could also be explained by lower mobility among older teachers who would like to leave their newly assigned RAR school, but cannot for family reasons. For schools where Z L = 10%, not a single treatment effect can be displayed on the teaching structure. Once again, such a difference between the two discontinuities highlights the heterogeneity of treatment effects.
Maths and Literacy scores
Finally, we present results on student achievement. Table 6 reports estimates of treatment effects on junior high school score distributions. We find that treatment has a negative effect on scores, when significant. This result is more pronounced for schools where
and Z L > 10%. For these schools, the treatment effect differs for maths and French (Tables 6a). The negative effect of treatment on scores is mainly concentrated at the bottom of the French distribution, whereas, for maths, it is at the top of the distribution. For schools where Z L ≈ 10% and 80% ≥ Z F ≥ 67%, estimates are often insignificant (especially in French) but other than that, these effects are quite large and negative. For these schools, treatment effects are mainly visible in the middle of the Math score distribution. Estimated treatment effect, standard error in bracket, bilateral test of equality between treated and non-treated schools. Level: * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%
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How can we interpret these results on the change in pupil achievement as a result of treatment? The results may be due to a combination of two distinct effects: a potential increase in the sorting of pupils across schools based on ability and/or parental schooling choice, and the potential inefficiency of the educational policy within treated schools. Our results imply the existence of at least one of these two effects. It cannot be excluded that the policy has had a positive effect on pupil achievement for those that remain in treated schools, but this effect might be compensated for by an increase in a pupil selection effect across schools. Moreover, we note that we can only observe the results of pupils up until 2009. Therefore observed final scores are relevant to pupils who began junior high schools before the beginning of the RAR program. As a consequence this result can differ from the effect of policy on pupils having a full scholarship into treated schools.
A referee suggested that the test results should not be pooled to assess the program impact on score results. We have thus estimated the effect of RAR treatment with an unequal length of treatment:
where T it equals 1 if the junior high school i enters the RAR program at date t. These variables T it 1 {t=j} are instrumented by 1 {Z i≥c } 1 {t=j} . We obtain similar results which are robust to a differentiating length treatment effect.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have evaluated the effect of the RAR educational policy, introduced in French public junior high schools in September 2006. To do so, we used two strong discontinuities in assignment to the treatment. For schools close to these two discontinuities, no substantial desired treatment effects stand out. Precisely, resources allocated to schools were disappointing around the thresholds. Second, we found that the policy worsens social segregation across schools when measured by parental occupation. This may induce the reduced achievement we observed in treated schools. The RAR assignment would therefore appear to have had a strong negative signaling effect, encouraging better students to move from their junior high school. An alternative, but discouraging, explanation would be that the policy has had a negative effect on achievement in treated schools. Our results on teachers indicate an increase in the proportion of older and less qualified teachers. This could be explained by a reassignment of older primary teachers to RAR schools, in order 27 Estimated treatment effect, standard error in bracket, bilateral test of equality between treated and non-treated schools. Level: * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1% 28 for them to obtain promotion more easily.
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